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ABSTRACT: A reality may be defined incompletely as a perpetuating pattern of relations. This 
definition denies the name of reality to an utter and totalistic patternlessness, like a primal 
patternless stuff, because a patternless all-ness would be indistinguishable from a patternless 
nothingness. If reality began from a chaos or patternless stuff, it became a reality only when it 
became patterned. If there are orders of reality with perpetuating relations between them, as 
in Cartesian interactive substance dualism, the definition allows us to say that these orders 
belong to a common reality by virtue of those relations. However, the definition is silent on the 
question of whether reality is ultimately pluralistic. Some suggestions are made about the 
possibility of stuffless patterns, including those of the physical world, but the definition is not 
dependent on the possibility of stufflessness. 
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AN ECUMENICAL DEFINITION 
Reality has made a comeback in recent years. A generation ago it was common in 
academic circles to hear about the ‘social construction of reality’, usually with at least 
the hint of a suggestion that there can be no such thing as reality prior to our creation 
of it. Today, however, we see realism returning even to the continental tradition as 
with the ‘speculative’ realisms of Meillassoux and others. According to Arun 
Saldanha, ‘The recovery of philosophy’s original Galilean relationship to the physical 
and mathematical sciences is especially urgent, after the linguistic turn, the fad of 
postmodernism, and the ensuing science wars have put such great stress on this 
relationship. At the very least, then, speculative realism is not just good news for 
science, but a possible platform for new ecumenical experiments across the 
debilitating fissures between continental and analytic philosophy’.1 
1 Arun Saldanha, ‘Back to the Great Outdoors: Speculative Realism as Philosophy of Science’, Cosmos 
and History, vol. 5, no. 2, 2009, p. 310. 
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In support of such ecumenicism, it may be helpful to offer a definition of reality 
that is sufficiently open, by virtue of its deliberate incompleteness, to be useful in a 
variety of discursive contexts without excessively limiting the sorts of realities to which 
it may be applied. For example, the definition offered here is ultimately silent on the 
question of the sorts of stuff, if any, of which reality may consist. This openness or 
incompleteness allows us to use a single overlapping term to describe the possibility of 
mental or ideational realities, physical or scientific realities, social realities, 
mathematical realities, aesthetic realities, imaginative realities, and so on. The device 
of incompleteness allows for the possibility of a pluralism of realities and thereby 
avoids the suggestion that some sorts of realities must be reducible to other sorts of 
reality. However, the definition also openly allows for the possibility of relations 
between different sorts of realities such that we may speak of overlapping realities that 
include those different sorts. 
Definitions include and exclude. A complete definition includes all the attributes, 
properties or qualities of the thing to be defined and excludes all those that do not 
properly belong to it. An incomplete definition is one that specifies some of the 
attributes, properties or qualities that may be included and excluded but is silent 
about others that may or may not be. About such a notion as reality, a complete 
definition seems beyond us. However, an incomplete definition may nonetheless allow 
us to use the word meaningfully to discuss such questions as whether there is such a 
thing (or a pluralities of things) called reality and whether it (or they) may be created 
or are only ever discovered. 
The incomplete definition offered here is that a reality is the perpetuation of a 
pattern. A pattern may be defined minimally as the perpetuation, in one or more 
ways, of one or more relations. A reality then, whatever else it may also be, must be a 
perpetuating pattern of relations. What these relations may be, and what the elements 
or parts may be that are related in a reality, are among the questions about which the 
definition is silent. The definition leaves open the possibility that the elements or parts 
of reality are themselves patterns of relations, perhaps even at the most basic level of 
reality. Perhaps reality is pattern all the way down. That possibility, which the 
definition allows for but does not require, is discussed below. 
Just as a reality may consist of various kinds of relations, so may the ways of 
perpetuation be various. The word and its variants are usefully open in their 
meanings, though not vacuously so. As a verb, ‘perpetuate’ may be taken as either 
transitive or intransitive. The adjective ‘perpetual’ may be taken as a synonym for 
‘eternal’ but it need not be taken in that way. Perhaps realities can be created that 
become perpetual, for example, without being eternal in the sense of uncreated. The 
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notion of perpetuation, while not utterly indeterminate in its meaning, is sufficiently 
open to allow for a variety of theories of reality to be included within the terms of the 
definition. 
Some of the possible ways of perpetuation may involve temporality and spatiality 
but the definition is intended to be independent of any particular theory of time and 
space. If time and space are to be describable as belonging to the patterns of reality, 
they cannot be notionally foundational to the definition of reality. If time and space 
exist in (so to speak) reality, reality cannot be defined as that which exists in (literally) 
time and space. Hence a reality is not defined here as the patterns that perpetuate in 
time and space, though some patterns may do so; rather, time and space, if they are to 
be understood as real, must be included among the perpetuating patterns of reality.  
Perpetuation may itself be a relation, as when one pattern has a causal or 
generative relation to another pattern. In such cases, ‘perpetuate’ becomes a transitive 
verb. However, a cause is not real if nothing is caused and nothing does the causing. 
Hence we may say of a given pattern of reality, if it includes the relation of causal or 
generative perpetuation, that it must also include a pattern of relations in addition to 
the relation of causality or generativity itself. Reality is the perpetuation of relations; it 
is not the perpetuation of perpetuation by itself. Self-perpetuation alone is not a 
reality because it lacks pattern.  
If realities are created, the act of creation must be a relation of perpetuation 
between one reality and another. Creativity requires at a minimum a creator, a 
creation and a relation of perpetuation between them. A creator is not a creator 
unless it creates something beyond itself. Creativity without creation is not 
conceivable as a reality. A primal act of self-creation is conceivable only as the 
existential separation of the self into self-creator and self-creation. The latter must be 
an otherness; that is, a new existence. Creativity is the making of an existential 
difference. If nothing existentially new and different has been created, no act of 
creation has occurred. Hence a self-creator cannot be an unpatterned unity. 
Also excluded is the possibility of a patternless stuff or material as real by itself. 
The central reason for this exclusion is that patternless stuff, hypothesized as existing 
totalistically by itself, must lack all distinctions, including the distinction between 
somethingness and nothingness. Such a stuff could become real only if patterns, 
including relations of distinction, were exogenously given to it. While by itself the 
distinction between real and unreal is inadequate to define reality beyond a double 
negation (a reality is not an unreality), nonetheless reality can have no meaning if that 
distinction is obviated. Stuff considered as existentially alone would lack any pattern 
of distinctions; hence a universal unpatterned somethingness would be 
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indistinguishable from a universal unpatterned nothingness. Similarly, a perfect 
Parmenidean oneness would be indistinguishable from a perfect nothingness since 
both, by excluding all distinctions, must lack the possibility of any distinction from 
each other.  
Each alone is as unthinkable as the other. Nothingness is unthinkable not because 
it is stuffless but because it is patternless. Concepts are patterns; hence patternlessness 
is describable but not fully imaginable. Though unthinkable as a totality brought 
exhaustively to one’s consciousness – to do so is not to think of nothing, it is not to 
think – nothingness may be defined as the total absence of all distinctions and all 
patterns. Indeed it should not be called no-thing, if the latter implies a distinction 
from some-thing. The nihil is not no thing; it is no pattern. 
As Hegel pointed out, ‘Being, pure being … is pure indeterminateness and 
emptiness…. Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, 
absence of all determination and content — undifferentiatedness in itself…. Pure being 
and pure nothing are, therefore, the same’.2 Hegel’s answer was to posit that nothingness 
and somethingness become meaningful only if ‘Becoming’, as the synthesis of ‘Being’ 
and ‘Nothing’, is taken as the foundational concept of reality. Here we see the 
Hegelian dialectic in its most primal ontological form: from the antithetic struggle of 
being and not being, new existences become real. Hegel defended this account by 
allying it explicitly with the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo against that of ex nihilo 
nihil fit.3 By this self-identification, and by the overall tendency of his thought, we can 
locate Hegel’s philosophy as belonging to the development of the modern post-
Christian pattern of belief in which humans gradually replaced the biblical God as the 
creators of reality. In Hegel’s contribution to this tradition, humans participate, as 
appropriate to their cultural stage of development, in the self-creation through history 
of ‘absolute spirit’.4 Unless one believes that he created the idea on his own, it appears 
evident that Hegel inherited his idea of ontological ‘Becoming’ by perpetuating a 
pattern of thought, received from Christianity, according to which reality is created 
rather than merely discovered.  
2 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, Amherst NY, Humanity Books, 1969, p. 82. Emphases 
in original. 
3 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 84. 
4 The theme is repeated in the Science of Logic: ‘Thus consciousness on its onward path from the 
immediacy with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge…. This is true in still greater measure 
of absolute spirit which reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the 
end of the development is known as freely externalising itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an 
immediate being – opening or unfolding itself into the creation of a world…’, p. 71. Emphases in original. 
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However, to acknowledge the indistinguishability of a pure somethingness alone 
from a pure nothingness alone, one need neither commit oneself to nor reject a 
creationist ontology. Instead one need only conclude that reality must include 
patterns, regardless of whether they are created or discovered. One may believe that 
the perpetuation of the patterns of reality is best explained as in a creationist ontology 
but the definition does not require us to take that additional step.  
In some creation mythologies, reality is seen as beginning from an utter chaos or 
from an utterly unpatterned stuff, but in such stories there must always be an 
exogenous source that gives patterns of order to that chaos or stuff. Hence reality 
begins in these stories not from chaos or stuff alone but from the organizing activity of 
a pattern-giver. Such a world-maker must either be a knower of eternal realities like 
the demiourgos of Plato’s Timaeus or it must be the creator ex nihilo of those patterns like 
the God of Christianity. Either way, the created world in such stories can only have 
become a reality upon receiving those patterns. The reality is the pattern, not the 
chaotic stuff. If all of reality was made from chaotic stuff, it cannot have already been 
a reality. Neither can pattern have come from an unpatterned self-creator, because 
self-creativity is a perpetuating relation between self-creator and self-creation (as 
described above) that belongs to a pattern. In every case pattern comes first. 
Modern science is commonly seen as materialistic in its ontology but this 
description, if thinly conceived, is misleading. Science is not about unpatterned matter 
but about the patterns that make up matter; it is about the regularities – that is, the 
perpetuating patterns – that order the world. The qualities of matter, like mass, are 
defined by relational equations like Newton’s first law. The laws of science, regardless 
of whether they are more than just Humean regularities, are the perpetuating patterns 
of nature. In short, science is primarily about pattern and only secondarily, if at all, 
about matter. If there was a ‘big bang’ and if its causes are discovered, then science 
will have found a causal pattern of reality prior to the origin of matter. A science that 
can search for a reality in which the origin of matter is explained cannot be one that 
identifies reality with matter. Reality in modern science is not stuff but the patterns 
that explain stuff. 
 The question is discussed below as to whether some kinds of reality may exist in 
the absence of any stuff at all, but this possibility is not required by the definition. 
Reality at a minimum includes perpetuating patterns of relations; what else it may 
include is additional to the definition proposed here. A reality must include patterns, 
whether or not it includes stuff. Without pattern there is no reality. Conversely, an 
unreality is the absence of pattern or the failure of relations to perpetuate. When an 
erstwhile reality loses its pattern, it loses its reality even if it leaves stuff behind. That 
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stuff will remain real only if it is transformed into another pattern of reality, as when a 
living thing becomes a dead thing, then a rotting thing and then dirt. Each of these 
states is a reality and if we can discover the causal regularities that link these states, we 
can relate them into a single dynamic pattern of reality. 
The definition is unavoidably incomplete in its enumeration of both the kinds of 
relations there may be and the ways of perpetuation that may constitute a reality, 
because the whole of reality cannot be defined here. However, some possible ways of 
perpetuation are discussed in a section below.  
By focusing on the perpetuation of pattern as the minimal defining attribute of 
reality, the definition allows us to use a common vocabulary to talk about realities that 
are often thought to be of quite different sorts. To borrow from the jargon of 
information technology, the definition is designed to be ‘platform neutral’. There may 
be material realities, mental realities and others like mathematical realities that seem 
exclusively neither material nor mental. Among mental realities, there may be those 
that are imagined, those that are perceived, those that are remembered, those that are 
deductively constructed or inductively hypothesized, and so on. Even the merest 
fantasy or fleeting daydream is real, according to this definition, as long as its patterns 
last.  
If there are perpetuating relations between material and mental realities or among 
mental, physical, mathematical and other patterns, the definition would allow us to 
say that these patterns belong, by virtue of those relations, to a common reality or at 
least to an intersecting or overlapping one. To take as an example the interactive 
substance dualism of Descartes, we may say that mind and body are not separate 
realities, or at least are not entirely so, because the perpetuating relations of 
interaction included in that theory belong to a shared pattern. This commonality 
need not be complete, however. It may be that there are some mental patterns that 
are not reducible or fully relatable to bodily patterns, just as there are autonomous 
bodily patterns (like the beating of one’s heart) of which the mind need take no notice. 
It may be that the overlapping reality between mind and body is incompletable as 
closed system, perhaps because our knowledge is inadequate or because realities are 
just irreducibly pluralistic.5 The overlapping reality may be just one more pattern of 
relations, or one more reality, in addition to the overlapped realities. It may be that 
5 If ‘possible worlds’ are real, the definition allows us to say, (1) each is a reality only if there are 
perpetuating relations within them, and (2) they are separate and plural realities only if there are no 
relations between them. If (2) does not hold because there are discoverable relations between possible 
worlds – if for example they occupy different locations in a common spatial and temporal dimensions – 
then we may instead say that (2’) there is a single reality in which these possible worlds co-exist. 
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nothing is just one thing; perhaps everything is what it is by virtue of the pattern to 
which it belongs and perhaps those patterns are plural.  
Nonetheless, if various realities can be brought into patterns of relation to each 
other, then among plural realities there would seem to be some that are more 
comprehensive or inclusive. Perhaps some realities are greater than others. If there is 
a theoretical limit to the project of unifying reality (as suggested for example by 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem), then the pluralism of realities only gives us more 
reason to search for more patterns and for more of the perpetuating relations within 
and among them. Pluralism is not nihilism – manyness is not nothingness – and the 
search for more pattern is not contingent on the possibility of its perfection or 
completion. If patterns are infinitely many, then we may always find more of them 
and more relations among them. 
CLASSICAL ONTOLOGIES 
We cannot here discuss every ontological theory but it may be illustrative to survey 
briefly some familiar examples from Western antiquity. For Anaximander, to apeiron 
was the primitive limitlessness prior to the origin of the elements of the world. To be 
the source of their reality, however, to apeiron would antecedently have had to contain 
the pattern of oppositions (hot-cold; moist-dry) that defines or delimits them. To 
apeiron therefore either was not completely patternless (which would seem to belie the 
name) or it was not the source of reality because the patterns of oppositions must have 
come from elsewhere. The same may be said of water for Thales or air for 
Anaximenes, each of which alone cannot have been the complete source or basis of 
reality. As Aristotle pointed out (Metaphysics, 984a), something beyond this material 
must have caused it to change into the things of the world. It fell to others like 
Anaxagoras to fill the explanatory gap in such systems by proposing nous as the 
rational organizing principle of the cosmos. For the Pythagoreans, the theory that ‘all 
is number’ was an early attempt to understand reality in terms of its underlying 
mathematical patterns, an idea resurrected by Neopythagorean scientists like Kepler 
in early modernity.6 
Heraclitus was cryptic but we may to read him to say that while reality includes a 
flux of change, these changes occur within fixed continua defined by perpetual 
relations of opposition. Conflict or ‘war’ is the source of all, yet this conflict occurs 
within a fixed pattern, which he called logos, described by the parameters or poles of 
opposition. Reality is the regularity discoverable within change: the sun is always new 
6 Charles H. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History, Indianapolis and Cambridge, Hackett, 
2001. 
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yet the day is the same. Hence what nature hides from us is its eternal pattern, not its 
mysterious creativity. Notwithstanding post-Christian interpretations in which he 
appears as a philosopher of existential newness, Heraclitus in this reading remains a 
classical eternalist. 
Aristotle followed the ancient materialists in attempting to ground the 
perpetuation of reality in a continuous passive stuff, which he called prime matter, but 
it played a limited role in his system. In his hylomorphism, the hyle holds no meaning 
without the morphe. Just has form has priority over matter in his hylomorphism, 
actuality has priority over potentiality. (The correspondence of form to actuality and 
of matter to potentiality is in Metaphysics 1048b. The priority of actuality to potentiality 
is at 1049b.) In Aristotle’s teleological ontology, reality is a rational temporal pattern 
of development from potentiality to actuality as exemplified by the way in which 
matter takes on form. The priority for Aristotle is always on pattern, not stuff. 
Aristotle’s this-worldly science was a search for the patterns of the world including 
natural causality, astrodynamics and teleological development, while his logic and the 
categories sought the patterns of truth.  
In the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, the One is somehow the source of the changeless 
patterns of Intellect; Soul is the temporal animation of those patterns in the world; 
and matter is ontologically and morally privative because it lacks any pattern of its 
own. Matter is evil and it is nothing because it lacks the unifying relations of pattern 
that make things both good and real. However, with Plotinus again arises the 
unresolved problem of how the patterns of reality can emerge from the patternlessness 
of the One. It is the perfection of the relation of togetherness or connectedness, but as 
the perfection of unity, its differentiation into the patterns of the world becomes 
inexplicable. 
Was Plato’s ontology about simple essences or complex patterns? Some of the 
more commonplace examples of the Platonic forms like those of a couch and a table 
would seem to include an internal structure of relations (Republic 596b). Some of the 
higher ideals like justice and harmony also seem to be relational patterns, such that 
justice is the ordering and harmonizing of the other virtues within the soul and the 
city (Republic 443d et passim). Elsewhere, however, higher forms are described as 
internally uniform and simple. In the Symposium (211b-211e), the iconic Diotima is 
remembered by Socrates as describing the form of beauty as utterly singular, unified 
and unalloyed. In the Republic (611e-612a), the immortality of the philosophical soul is 
suggested to be simple and uniform (monoeides) like the eternal truths to which it is 
akin. In the Phaedrus (271a), the soul is called one and the same (hen kai homoion). In both 
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works, the simplicity and oneness of the soul is contrasted to the inferior manyness of 
bodily things. 
However, Plato’s philosophy also included an ontology of pattern as a dominant 
theme in the middle and late dialogues. For example in the educational progression of 
the Republic (522-532), the intelligence first learns of number from the relation of 
distinction implicit in the sorts of perceptions that require a relative comparison, such 
as hard versus soft or large versus small. From these oppositions we learn of the idea 
of difference or twoness. But this means we have also learned of twoness (the concept 
of difference) in distinction to oneness (the concept of sameness). Thus by the 
application of intelligence to sensation we have discovered the relation of distinction 
between the numbers one and two. Oneness as such (auto to hen) remains the key to the 
study of true being (524e-525a), but the arithmetic system from the beginning includes 
the relation of difference or twoness. Next in the educational progression comes 
geometry, the study of spatial patterns in two and three dimensions; then comes 
astronomy with its four-dimensional (as we say today) patterns of heavenly motions; 
then come the more abstract, because unseen, patterns of musical harmony. Finally in 
the dialectic, the student learns of patterns as such in their full abstraction from any 
physical instantiation. The highest understanding belongs to the sunoptikos dialektikos 
(537c), a rhyming couplet that refers not to simplicities but to the seeing-together of 
the complex patterns of reality. The sun- and sum- prefixes, from which English gets 
‘syn-’ and ‘sym-‘, are often significant in Plato’s works (examples appear below). They 
point to unity not as uniformity but as a relation of togetherness or connectedness. 
On this reading, we may see Plato’s Form of the Good synoptically not as a 
simple and homogenous essence but as the connectedness and orderliness that gives a 
unifying pattern to reality. The Good is the pattern that makes one of the many. Just 
as justice is the pattern of order that creates a proportioned and harmonious oneness 
of the other virtues, goodness is the perpetuating order that is the foundation of the 
patterns of reality. Hence in the Phaedo (99c), the Good is described as that which 
rightly unifies and holds things together (to agathon kai deon sundein kai sunekhein), which 
Socrates awaiting death says he had sought as the cause that orders reality.  
In the Philebus, the notion of goodness as pattern is again a culminating theme. 
Oneness is not an utter simplicity; rather, the unity of the one in the many is in the 
harmonious pattern of order discovered by reason. The patterns of order appear 
when the definite (to peras) is imposed upon the indefinite (to apeiron), as for example 
when the definite patterns of grammar or music appear in the indefinite variability of 
sound (16c-17c). The one appears in the many as the indefinite becomes patterned by 
the definite. Its order includes the relations of number, proportion, harmony and 
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temporal rhythm (17d-e). Thus manyness is not the opposite of oneness; rather, it is 
the ordered mid-range between the measured unity of definiteness and the 
measureless infinite (18a-b). Manyness lies between to peras and to apeiron and appears 
by the imposition of the former onto the latter, the ordering cause of which is sophia 
kai nous (30c). Bodily health, musical harmony and natural beauty each consist of 
orderly patterns of moderation and concord produced when the definite imposes 
number, measure and proportion upon the indefinite (25d-26d). When measure and 
proportion are lacking, the pattern is not true and cannot perpetuate (64d-e). But 
when they are joined with truth, the combination is identical with beauty and virtue, 
and belongs as a unity to the perpetual pattern of the Good (64e-65a). 
In the Sophist, disease is caused by the disruption of natural relations and 
deformity by the loss of proportion (228a). The Eleatic visitor argues, against of the 
Parmenidean notion of oneness as simple uniformity, that otherness or difference is 
ineliminable in the definition of reality. Anything that has the power to make a 
difference or to be made different is defined as real (247d-e). The body is related to the 
world of generation and decay by perception and the mind is related to the world of 
perpetual reality by rational thought, and these relations of participation or joining 
are defined as the power to affect or be affected when things combine or meet (248a-
b). Hence reality is a system of relations in which different things are connected; it is 
not a simplex but a complex. However, not all things may be joined. Just as the 
sciences of grammar and music are those that know which words and notes 
respectively may be rightfully combined, the dialectical science is that which knows in 
general the relations of differentiation and association of which reality consists (252e-
253e). The dissolution of all relations would be the destruction of all reason because it 
is only the systematic combination of ideas that makes reason possible (259e). 
In the Statesman, a creation story is told in which reality is the pattern of order 
imposed by a god, not upon matter but upon disorder as such. Disorder is the natural 
state to which the bodily realm in the absence of this imposed order must return 
(273a-e). In a discussion of due measure at the midpoint of the dialogue, we are told 
that in the arts, the due measure of practiced judgement by a craftsman is possible 
only if there exists a true standard of measure in reality (284a-b). To find the due 
measure of such things as the fitting, the timely and the rightful, we must go outside or 
beyond the oppositions of mere comparison (284e). Such measures require an 
understanding of the greater context or pattern in which each action by the craftsman 
is a part. The science of measurement has to do with all of reality but we must not 
forget that reality includes similarities and distinctions, including the varieties of 
measurement (285a-b). Just as the process of weaving begins by straining and 
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separating matted wool into threads before joining them fittingly into a fabric (280b-
281a), statecraft is the weaving of the properly distinguished arts with their respective 
virtues or excellences into an orderly civic whole (305e-311a). As in the earlier Republic, 
the good city is not that which equalizes and homogenizes the arts and their virtues 
but that which finds unity in the pattern of relations among them. 
Plato did not include matter in his ontology, not even in the Timaeus as is 
sometimes claimed, but he did there discuss the need for a kind of ‘receptacle’ (49a), 
‘mother’ (50d) or ‘nurse’ (52d), not as a stuff but as a locus of receptivity (52a-b), which 
by itself is patternless but which is passively capable of receiving the patterns of the 
intelligible (51a). The construction of the world is mythologized as the formation of 
patterns, geometrically rather than from a primal matter or stuff. The demiourgos gives 
order to disorder because the former is always better (30a). He does so by imposing 
proportion, the most beautiful of the bonding relations, on the four elements and 
thereby brings the sensible world into existence as a patterned unity (31b-32c). The 
elements themselves are not made of stuff but are constructed geometrically with form 
and number (53b). Hence the universe was not brought forth as a stuff or substance 
but was organized as a pattern, before which it was without rational order and 
measure (alogos kai ametros, 53a).The soul of the world is also constructed as a 
mathematical proportion combining the ideas of sameness, otherness and existence 
(35b-36b). It is because the soul is a proportionate pattern that it can participate in 
reason and harmony (36e-37a). In the Timaeus, physical reality is a pattern of relations 
without any stuff. 
In the Laws, the greatest harmony is the greatest wisdom (689d) and the task of 
the lawgiver is to protect against disorder using his knowledge of the proper measures 
of reality (691a-d). The Athenian describes the proportion and harmony found in the 
patterns of natural motion in order to demonstrate the primacy of rational lawfulness 
in the universe (893b-894a). The most rational pattern of movement is uniform 
rotation around a fixed center and absolute irrationality is exemplified by motions 
that are variable, uncentered, unsystematic and disorderly (898a-c). The educational 
progression of the Republic is rehearsed (817e-818d) with its highest stage described as 
the ability to order together everything that can be comprehensively seen (suntaxasthai 
panta sunoronta, 965b) and the highest task of which is to give a rational harmony, akin 
to that which rules the stars, to human customs, institutions and laws (967e). 
Each of these late works is exploratory and none can be taken as containing 
Plato’s finalized ontology because his works do not give us one. But each exploration, 
including his (perhaps earlier) theory of the Forms, is a search for the patterns of 
reality apart from its material. What the later dialogues may represent is a move away 
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from an earlier openness to the ideal of Parmenidean simplicity toward the idea that 
reality at its most basic is a complex pattern in which relations of distinction are 
ineliminable. Plato’s philosophical method was to search open-endedly for reality, 
which may suggest that for him perfect knowledge of its patterns remains beyond 
human abilities. Nonetheless, without the possibility of pattern, reality has no 
meaning. Moreover, it seems demonstrable that some patterns of understanding are 
more enduring than others when tested by reasoned argument. If the search for better 
patterns of understanding is to be possible, then the idea of perfected knowledge, if 
only as an asymptotic or regulative ideal, must be theoretically possible even if 
humanly unattainable.  
What significantly distinguished the pre-Socratics from the Athenian triumvirate 
of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle was the latter’s desire not just to find but to test the 
perpetuation of the patterns of reality. The centrally important deconstructive task of 
philosophy began as far as we know with the eristic tradition that arose with the 
Sophists and with Socrates. The Socratic dialectic is a critical method of ending the 
perpetuation of false patterns; Socratic reason is less often a glue that a solvent. Its 
task was to dissolve the many false patterns of belief so that the eternal truths within 
the soul could be recalled. In Platonic dialogues like the Sophist and the Parmenides, the 
excesses of eristics were criticized and were moderated but Plato never abandoned the 
method of elenchic dialogue; even in the Laws, it reappears in key passages 
interspersed among long monologues. Aristotle’s commentaries tell us of the earlier 
philosophers not to commemorate but to criticize them. Aristotle’s logic showed how 
ideas could be extended and explored but also it played the deconstructive role of 
excluding from truth those patterns that do not hold.  
If anything is ever real and true, then the task of finding it requires methods of 
clearing away those patterns of thought which, when critically examined, do not hold 
together or that hold things together falsely. There are many ways to relate things in 
our thoughts but there are many ways of thinking which upon critical examination do 
not persist. For example, the fact that we can easily yet fleetingly imagine a winged 
unicorn but that we cannot perceive one enduringly, and that we can easily and 
enduringly perceive an ordinary horse when one is present, suggests that some 
realities perpetuate more readily than others do. Merely imagined realities are those 
that cease to perpetuate when criticized using standards that belong to more stable 
patterns like those of reason and careful observation. The task of philosophy since the 
classical period has been to search for the perpetuating patterns of reality by finding 
the relations that hold as more than mere creations of the imagination. The task is in 
part deconstructive but it cannot be totalistically so because the tools of criticism are 
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based on perpetuating relations such as those of logic. Deconstruction is impossible if 
its tools turn out not to be real. 
PERPETUATION  
The familiar notion of temporal persistence is one possible mode of the perpetuation 
of patterns, as is the repetition of patterns in different locations in space and time. 
Motion is the dynamic pattern of changes of spatial location across time. In 
modernity, these relations were mathematized by such discoveries as Descartes’ 
coordinate system, his analytical geometry and the calculus of Newton and Leibniz. 
The mathematical mapping of the physical world across time allowed the ancient 
view of motion as the destruction of a perpetuating reality to be replaced by the 
discovery of previously unseen regularities. What modernity learned from the likes of 
Descartes and Newton was that observable earthly motions, and not just those of the 
heavens as the ancients had thought, display the regularity of pattern. Newton’s laws 
were later shown to be limited to a given inertial frame but this meant only that a 
more complex pattern of physics had been discovered in the variable compression of 
the dimensions of time and space. The scientific discovery of the patterns of nature is 
ongoing and exceptions such as quantum randomness may exist but so far these have 
not been sufficient to reduce reality to chaos. Indeed, the probability functions of 
subatomic physics are another kind of mathematical pattern. In the statistical 
aggregate, randomness produces probabilistic patterns rather than chaos. If God plays 
dice, the game yet has mathematical rules. In our current state of knowledge, nature 
seems to consist uniformly of mathematical patterns of relations.  
However, the definition of reality as pattern does not require us to reduce every 
reality to those of today’s physical sciences. For example, the definition leaves room 
for various understandings of time and space. If time is understood not as a dimension 
of spacetime but as a process from which new patterns emerge, those patterns may be 
said to become real only if and when they begin to perpetuate. In cyclical theories of 
time, the pattern of things repeats; in linear theories, it does not; in teleological 
theories, it is completed. If time and space are mental constructions of the Kantian 
sort, they are real as the necessary condition for our perception of the perpetuating 
patterns of temporal and spatial things. If time and space instead are merely cultural 
inventions and if reality is a social construction in a strong ontological sense, the 
patterns of such a reality must perpetuate once constructed; if not, the construction of 
a reality has failed. If reality is created, it continues to be real only if it perpetuates in 
some way. 
The definition also allows for the possibility of realities that are independent of 
time and space. For example, mathematical patterns and those of formal logic may be 
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described as timeless and spaceless. In the ancient view, such relations are eternal, 
which may mean either that they perpetuate for the entirety of time or that they 
perpetuate in a way that is entirely independent of time. Platonic forms, if there are 
such things, are non-temporal and non-spatial. Scientific laws describe the patterns of 
things in time and space but the laws themselves are not physical things that exist in 
time and space. Perhaps the laws of nature are eternal but if even if they were created 
by a higher cause or emerged from a founding event, they perpetuate in a way that 
does not seem temporal or spatial like the things they describe. If such laws define 
time and space, it is difficult to imagine them as existing in time and space.  
If the existence of eternal realities is impossible for temporal beings like us to 
prove, it is also impossible for us to prove their non-existence. Whether or not there 
are eternal realities, either omnitemporally (throughout all time) or extratemporally 
(independently of time), the question cannot be settled by definitional fiat so it is left 
open here.  
Also left open is an enumeration of the meanings of perpetuation. The notion is 
intended to be pluralistic for the sake of definitional inclusivity, but if its meanings are 
various they need not be contradictory. The pluralism of the word allows us to say 
that the patterns of reality are those that persist or repeat or grow or reproduce or are 
algorithmically generative or are causal or are creative or ... are able in some way or 
other to perpetuate. It may be that there are modes or ways of perpetuation that 
operate in combination with other modes or ways. There may be modes that act 
against other modes, as in the notion of creative destruction in which the persistence 
of an old pattern is destroyed by the generation of a new one. However, the possibility 
of destructive or mutually competitive modes of perpetuation does not mean that the 
notion of perpetuation is self-destructively ambiguous in its very meaning. Instead it is 
open and limited only by the ways is which patterns may be real. 
Perpetuation need not be everlasting for a given pattern to be named as real. An 
ephemeral pattern in time and space, like a lightning bolt, is real as long as it lasts. 
Fleeting patterns are real to the degree or extent that they achieve some kind or 
degree of perpetuation. When an impermanent reality like a lightning bolt or a living 
body goes out of existence, it is not its stuff but its pattern that has failed to 
perpetuate. Electrical energy is dispersed into other patterns as the lightening bolt 
ends its reality. A rock that crumbles into soil or a dead body that rots into dust leaves 
behind a mass of stuff but the rock or the body is no longer real because its particular 
pattern has ceased to exist. Even for a material thing, its reality is its pattern and not 
(or not just) its matter. When a particular pattern has failed to perpetuate, a particular 
reality has gone out of existence.  
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Within the context of a broader reality, perpetuation can also describe the process 
of destruction of a pattern or the ongoing unreality of a pattern. For example, in our 
time it is a reality that dinosaurs are no longer real. The process by which the 
dinosaurs perished was a dynamic or temporal pattern that was real while it occurred. 
A perpetuating process of destruction or pattern collapse can lead to state in which an 
erstwhile pattern no longer exists. The biological and behavioural patterns called 
‘dinosaurs’ failed to perpetuate in evolutionary history, but this is only to say that in 
the broader context of that history, the perpetuating reality of the process of evolution 
includes the end of the reality of the dinosaurs. Pattern-collapse or destruction, which 
is a failure of perpetuation, may be real in the context of a broader sequential or 
temporal pattern that is real. Hence the failure to perpetuate of a particular 
ephemeral pattern like a dinosaur is part of the perpetuating reality of evolutionary 
history.  
But the utter failure of all patterns to perpetuate would mean the end of reality 
altogether. If all of reality collapsed into patternless chaos, the latter might perpetuate 
but not as pattern and therefore not as reality. The perpetuation of total nothingness 
is still total nothingness. There can be perpetuating realities within which particular 
patterns collapse or are destroyed, but if all patterns were to collapse universally and 
forever after, reality will perpetually have come to an end. Perpetuation is not the sole 
criterion of reality; it must be the perpetuation of a pattern. 
Some modes of perpetuation may involve temporality but not spatiality, as in 
speech and music. Aural patterns may perpetuate by persisting for a time like single 
note, or they may repeat like the chorus in a melody, or they may perpetuate by a 
kind of extrapolation or growth as with variations on a musical theme. Musical 
improvisations do not appear from nowhere but are developed by building upon an 
initial pattern. An improvisation like those of John Coltrane begins by borrowing or 
establishing a recognizable melodic pattern and then grows, sometimes surprisingly 
but never arbitrarily, into a melodically related pattern.7 Such modes of artistic 
perpetuation may be understood as a kind of creation ex nihilo, as the bringing into 
being of an existentially new pattern, but an alternative view is to see successful artists 
7 ‘Motives and thematic ideas reappear at several points during a typical Coltrane piece, but not 
necessarily in a methodical manner. These serve as reminiscences that lend coherence to the melodic 
content of the solo. Usually the more structurally important connections are not these simple 
reminiscences but the progression from one motivic idea to the next…. Listening to Coltrane's recorded 
performances, we hear a composer at work, shaping, developing, and connecting musical ideas while 
attempting, often successfully, to keep the musical whole in perspective’. Lewis Porter, ‘John Coltrane's 
“A Love Supreme”: Jazz Improvisation as Composition’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, vol. 38, 
no. 3, 1985, pp. 620-21. 
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as the discoverers of the possibilities and limits of reality. Radical explorers like John 
Cage may attempt to remake music by breaking its patterns but they too begin from 
that which they seek to deconstruct. By departing from familiarity they cause us to 
search in our hearing for new patterns of meaning. The experience can be enlivening 
but it too is describable as a finding rather than as a creating. 
Perpetuation may also occur spatially without changes of time, as when similar 
geometrical forms are repeated in different locations within a given spatial frame, for 
example in a photograph of a child blowing bubbles. However, the experience of 
seeing spatial patterns, even if no motion occurs, does involve temporality because 
sensory experience is inherently temporal. To be real, an experience must persist for a 
time; if it recurs in time, its reality is confirmed and reinforced.8 In simple events of 
perception it is the patterns that persist and recur that we call real; a misperception by 
contrast is one that does not persist or recur as first imagined. A fevered imagination 
can produce vivid images but they disappear with the fever. A dream may be 
distinguished from wakefulness by the greater ephemerality of the patterns of the 
former. The experience of dreaming is real but only as long as its patterns persist, as 
are the patterns we merely imagine or remember.9 Various kinds of experiences 
including perceptions, imaginings, memories and dreams are defined here as real but 
they are variably real and are differentiable by their reliability or success in 
perpetuation. An accurate perception perpetuates more successfully, especially when 
tested by reason and experimentation, than a misperception or a mere imagining. 
The critical tests of reality in perception, like those in philosophy and science, are tests 
of the perpetuation of patterns. Some perceptions lead to insight and understanding, 
8 This suggests an answer to a problem in Humean empiricism about how habituation allows us to find a 
pattern on repeated observation though we cannot do so from an initial observation. How can a thought 
pattern repeat if it does not appear in the first instance? If mental events are understood always as 
perpetuating for an extended moment, then we may say that persistence is required for a pattern to form 
and recurrence is required both to confirm and to reinforce it. Persistence sets; recurrence cures. 
Persistence and recurrence are the modes of perpetuation that must be present for thought patterns to 
become real. Humean habituation is the temporal perpetuation, minimally including persistence and 
recurrence, of a pattern of experience such that it becomes a mental reality. 
9 The example of memory is illustrative of the role of pattern in thinking. We are able to remember 
individual items more easily when we can fit them into patterns, even if the latter are entire fabrications 
as with mnemonic techniques like the ‘memory palace’. By constructing a fictional pattern of relations 
among items, we remember them much more easily because memories, like all thoughts, consist of 
patterns of relations. That is why proper nouns like peoples’ names, which are semantically arbitrary, are 
more difficult to remember than common nouns, which take their meaning from Quinean ‘webs’ of 
ideas. A thought is a web or a pattern of relations and not just group of separate ideational items. The 
mind is never just a Humean ‘heap’ but is always a structure of relations through which meanings take 
form. The mind is informed by patterns of reality. 
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which is to say that they belong to a greater pattern of meaning. They perpetuate not 
just by persisting and recurring but by also by growing and connecting. 
We do not experience the physical world directly; instead we experience relatively 
stable patterns of perception. The abductive hypothesis that most of us form to 
explain this stability is that our perceptions are caused by an independently existing 
physical world, though Berkeley for example offered a competing hypothesis. We 
learn of that stability by comparing it to the greater ephemerality of misperceptions 
and mere imaginings. Some experiential patterns perpetuate more successfully than 
others, even when tested by reasoned observation. The patterns of perception that 
perpetuate most robustly against such tests are those that, open-endedly and 
fallibilistically, we may call empirical truths. Those that perpetuate by growing into 
and joining with greater patterns of meaning are those that are importantly true. 
Patterns may grow from seeds of various sorts, like those of plants or crystals. 
Patterns like DNA are algorithmic codes that allow subsequent patterns to grow in 
time and space. Such algorithms are growth-determining patterns that allow further 
patterns to perpetuate physically, but their own reality is not physical. They are 
purely formal or, in an active sense of the word, informational: they are patterns that 
form other patterns. Algorithmic patterns like DNA or a recipe book contain the 
possibilities of patterns that will appear if the right conditions are present and if the 
encoded instructions are followed. Algorithmic generativity is the perpetuation of one 
kind of pattern by a different kind of pattern given the right pattern of conditions. 
Communication is the perpetuation of a pattern of experience or mental activity 
from one mind to another. It too is informational in the active sense of the word. Its 
processes are often imperfect but the degree to which communication succeeds is the 
degree to which a mental pattern has been perpetuated from one mind to another. To 
communicate is to participate in shared patterns of thinking and feeling. The fact that 
most of our patterns of thinking are not original to us individually but come from 
others is good evidence against solipsism. Language is among our most important 
realities because it allows us to share patterns of experience. To communicate is to 
participate in a shared reality. The test of communicative success turns on whether a 
reality has been perpetuated between persons. 
To tell a story is to relate things into a narrative pattern. Metaphorical thinking is 
the propensity to see one thing on the pattern of another. A good metaphor, like a 
good story, is one that helps us see that things fit together in a way we had not 
previously experienced. However, the experience of newness may be more usefully 
called a discovery than a creation. A metaphor works by allowing us to use a familiar 
pattern of understanding, formed in one context, to experience another context in a 
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new way. The experience of newness is not a creation out of nothingness but the 
discovery of a reality that we had not noticed before. An artist is not an existential 
god; rather he or she is someone who finds meanings that others have not yet 
discovered. The artist is someone who discovers new possibilities of experience, yet 
the criterion of artistic meaning is not newness but pattern. 
Sometimes our metaphors are forgotten. The belief that humans are creators is 
modern and largely Western; it seems likely to have been inherited from the 
existential creationism of the Bible. Humans are habitual thinkers who become 
enculturated into patterns of understanding. Among the oldest habituations in the 
West is the metaphor of humans as the image and likeness of God. Creativity is a 
copied idea; no one today created it. As modern Westerners, we have been 
enculturated into seeing ourselves as creators on the pattern of the God of Genesis. 
The alternative is to see ourselves as discoverers of the patterns of reality in all their 
variety and to see newness as belonging to the richness of what we have yet to learn. 
WHAT STUFF? 
Can the substance of reality be pattern without stuff?10 The definition is silent on the 
question of whether stuff is necessary, though it is not neutral on the relative 
importance of patterns versus stuff. The definition directs our ontological focus away 
from stuff toward the patterns without which, even for materialists, stuff has no 
meaning. For a materialist like Hobbes, for example, reality is not matter alone; 
instead reality is the mechanistic patterns of matter in time and space. In ontologies 
that include non-material stuffs, pattern is also requisite. In Hegel’s idealism, reality is 
not undifferentiated thought-stuff; it is the emergent pattern of ideas in history. The 
dualism of Descartes is commonly seen as including two kinds of stuff, res cogitans and 
res extensa, ideational stuff and material stuff, which respectively are patterned as two 
kinds of reality. 
As noted briefly above, in Cartesian interactive substance dualism, the two kinds 
of stuff are related by their interactions. The definition of reality as pattern allows us 
to say to Cartesian dualists that mind and body, by virtue of their relations of 
interaction, belong to a single overlapping reality. The pattern of a tree as a physical 
arrangement of molecules and the pattern of a tree as it is experienced in perception 
may be of different alleged stuffs but this need not cause us to say that they are 
separate realities. By focusing on pattern rather than stuff, we may say that the 
physical tree and the experiential tree belong to the same reality by virtue of 
10 ‘Substance’ here means that which ‘stands under’ as ontologically basic. Only in materialism does 
substance mean matter. 
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perpetuating relations between them. Hence the definition gives us a conceptual 
bridge across the Cartesian divide. The definition does not tell us what those relations 
are or how they perpetuate but it does direct our attention to a meaningful sense in 
which there is a shared reality in which minds and bodies exist together. The 
alternative focus on stuff as the basis of reality diverts us from the possibility of such a 
reality and deepens that divide.  
Similarly, the focus on pattern rather than stuff gives us a vocabulary with which 
we may say that communication between minds is the sharing of a common reality, 
whereas the idea of minds as individuated thought-stuff exaggerates the separateness 
of minds. If, as in Hume’s metaphor, the mind is not the theatre but the play, then 
communication is the means by which we join the performance.11 
But is it possible to imagine an ontology of pattern in the absence of any basic 
stuff? Can relations be ontologically elementary or foundational? It does seem that for 
some realities, no obvious kind of stuff is required. It is a reality that one plus one 
equals two. Mathematical truths of this sort describe perpetual relations without stuff. 
It would be odd to insist that mathematical patterns are real only when they are 
instantiated in some kind of substance such as those of physicality or ideation – that 
one plus one equals two in reality only when two physical things are actually present 
or when a mind has the knowledge that one plus one equals two. Mathematical 
patterns are real independently of physical or mental instantiation. It would also seem 
odd to insist that mathematical patterns must consist of some other special kind of 
mathematical stuff. Mathematical realities are patterns without stuff. 
The meanings of ‘one’ and ‘two’ are given by the relations of each to the other 
and to the broader pattern of mathematics in general. Perhaps the overall pattern of 
mathematics should per Gödel be described as an open Quinean web of meanings 
rather than as a closed analytical system. Quine’s objection to analyticity reinforces 
the point that things take their meaning from their relations within a greater pattern.12 
Is it possible that the physical world consists of pattern more fundamentally than it 
consists of stuff? As mathematical thinker, Descartes, perhaps with a cue from Plato, 
defined the physical world geometrically as res extensa, which is a pattern of spatial 
11 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1739-40, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 6. 
12 W.V.O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. Cambridge MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1961. Quine’s objection was not to the relational nature of definitions 
belonging to analyticity but to the supposed closedness of its patterns. If the patterns that produce 
meanings are broader and more open than analyticity allows, then meanings may change if the broader 
pattern or ‘fabric’ of belief changes, precisely because meanings are relational. 
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relations.13 Our clear and distinct ideas about physicality are only those of shape, size 
and motion, each of which has to do with pattern rather than stuff.14 The slogan 
attributed to Kepler, ‘ubi materia, ibi geometria’, says where there is matter, there is 
geometry. According to Galileo, mathematics is the language and geometrical figures 
are the alphabet in which the book of the universe is written.15 That such sayings are 
well known shows that the primacy of pattern in physics is not only a thinkable but a 
familiar notion among today’s scientific commentators.  
In modern physics, matter is not an operational term. Terms like mass and energy 
are defined in mathematical equations by their relation to other such terms, including 
each other as in Einstein’s most famous equation. Energy and mass have meaning, 
scientifically and more colloquially, by virtue of the patterns to which they belong. 
This need not mean that their reality is relativistic and reducible to arbitrary human-
made definitions; instead we may say that their meanings are real because they belong 
to patterns that have been tested and that, given our current levels of understanding, 
seem to be real. Energy and mass are real, as best we can tell, because they appear to 
belong to a pattern of reality that has held together.  
Planck’s constant tells us that energy comes in minimal quanta, such that the 
physical universe is sometimes said to be ‘grainy’ at the finest level. This suggests that 
physical existence may be digital at its most basic level. It is a pattern of binary digits 
or ‘bits’ of existence, bits defined by the relation of contradistinction between 
something and nothing, mathematically given as one and zero. If physical reality is 
digital rather than continuous at the finest scale, then it may be that the physical 
world at the most basic level is pattern, not stuff, because binary digits or bits are pure 
patterns without stuff. They are mathematical patterns in which the parts, one and 
zero, are entirely defined by the relation of distinction between them. A bit is not the 
relation between two kinds of stuff but two kinds of states, something and nothing, 
which are defined purely by the difference between them. Neither alone is 
meaningful. In a binary digit, the relation of distinction does all the existential work. 
No material is needed. If physical reality is ‘grainy’ in that sense at the most basic 
level, then its substance is pattern without stuff. 
13 Plato had already described the physical world in terms of length, breadth, depth, as well as force or 
strength, and had also described these in contradistinction to mind or soul (Laws, 896d).  
14 Descartes seemed ambivalent as to whether there can be extension without stuff. On one hand, matter 
is nothing but extension because everything else can be stripped from it (Principles of Philosophy, II.iv, II.xi); 
on the other, a vacuum cannot exist because there can be no extension unless a substance is extended 
(II.vxiii). 
15 Galileo Galilei, The Assayer, in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans. Stillman Drake, New York, 
Doubleday, 1957, pp. 237-38. 
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Alternatively, perhaps the physical world at the finest grainy level nonetheless 
consists of energy, which is the foundational stuff of physical reality. Perhaps physical 
reality requires not just a binary relation of distinction as such but the specific relation 
of distinction between a minimal quantum of energy and a quantumless nothingness. 
If so, it remains evident that physical reality at the finest level is not just unpatterned 
energy but a grainy pattern of energy. Matter is pattern, even if it is a pattern of stuff. 
Physical reality may be a pattern of stuff or it may be pattern alone, but it is not stuff 
alone. 
Some physicists today think that particles are ‘compactifications’ of multi-
dimensional geometrical ‘strings’ or ‘branes’ (from membranes) and that spacetime is 
not the given framework within which they interact but is a phenomenon that 
emerges from the patterns of their interactions. Such theories are works in progress 
but they accord with the suggestion above that space and time or spacetime, if it is to 
be described as a reality, cannot be that within which reality happens. In the 
geometric foundationalism of these theories, the basis of reality is the geometry of 
relations by which spacetime and everything else is able perpetuate (a view that in one 
such account began with the Pythagoreans and was developed in Plato’s Timaeus).16 
To conclude, where there is a reality, there is a pattern; where there is no pattern, 
there is no reality. The meaning of reality is in its perpetuating patterns and not its 
perpetuating stuff. Perhaps some realities consist of patterns of stuff but in any reality, 
its pattern is its essence and foundation.  
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16 ‘In addition to realizing that mathematics was the key to fathoming our universe, he introduced an 
approach we now call the geometrization of physics—the same leap that Einstein made. In an act of 
great prescience, Plato suggested that the elements of nature, their qualities, and the forces that act upon 
them may all be the result of some hidden geometrical structure that conducts its business behind the 
scenes’. Shing-Tung Yau and Steve Nadis, The Shape of Inner Space: String Theory and the Geometry of the 
Universe's Hidden Dimensions, New York, Basic Books, 2010, xix. Reference to Pythagoreans, pp. 21-22. 
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